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I. INTRODUCTION 
Under Sixth Circuit Rule 32.1(b) (the Rule), as in most other circuits,1 
published opinions are binding on the court and can only be overruled by the 
court en banc.2 If a Sixth Circuit district court determines that two published 
Sixth Circuit opinions conflict, it must set aside the later opinion and apply the 
                                                                                                                     
  Associate, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP. 
 1 The Sixth Circuit’s “first in time” approach is in line with most, but not all, circuits. 
The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits share the Sixth Circuit’s 
position that, in the absence of an intervening decision by a court of higher authority, only 
an en banc circuit court may overrule a prior published decision. Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 
F.3d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 2000); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 610–11 (3d Cir. 
2002); United States v. Kirk, 528 F.2d 1057, 1063 (5th Cir. 1976); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 
F.3d 687, 700–01 n.12 (8th Cir. 2001); Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co., 523 F.3d 924, 932–33 
(9th Cir. 2008); George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348, 1351–52 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). In the Second and Seventh Circuits, a panel may overrule a prior published 
opinion via “mini-en banc,” a practice in which the overruling opinion is circulated to the 
entire court beforehand for a vote on en banc review. See 7TH CIR. R. APP. P. 40(e); 
Diebold Found., Inc. v. Comm'r, 736 F.3d 172, 183 n.7 (2d Cir. 2013). Mini en-banc has 
other uses too. See Alexandra Sadinsky, Note, Redefining En Banc Review in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2025 (2014) (explaining that mini en-banc 
is also used “when a panel addresses a question of first impression” and “when a panel 
creates or continues a circuit split . . .”). In the Eighth Circuit, a panel may not overrule an 
earlier panel, but where an intra-circuit conflict has already come into being, a third, 
subsequent, panel is not required to follow the earliest decision but is “free to choose which 
line of cases to follow.” Kilmartin v. Dormire, 161 F.3d 1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 2 6TH CIR. R. 32.1(b). 
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earlier one.3 The way a district court approaches a potential conflict under the 
Rule reflects a choice (or a compromise) between obedience and accuracy.4 
When invoked at the trial level, this “first in time” rule makes the district 
court—which is otherwise bound by all Sixth Circuit decisions—the arbiter of 
whether an appellate panel exceeded its authority.  
This Article identifies four approaches taken by district courts in recent 
decisions applying the Rule, and discusses how those approaches balance 
accuracy in applying the rule against obedience to the judicial hierarchy that 
requires district courts to defer to the appellate court.5   
The “objective” approach focuses on accuracy in applying the Rule above 
all—perhaps believing that hierarchy is served well enough by the availability 
of appeal from its decision, which gives the appellate court the last word. The 
“conciliatory” approach seeks to balance accuracy and obedience by 
contriving to reconcile all prior published cases, although—like the Marks v. 
United States “narrowest holding” approach to Supreme Court precedent6—it 
can result in an outcome that neither panel would approve of and thereby fail 
to serve either principle. The “obedient” approach decisively chooses 
obedience to the appellate court over accuracy in adhering to the Rule. And the 
“substantive” approach incorporates the district court’s opinion on the 
substance of the conflicting decisions into its application of the Rule, thereby 
arguably subverting the usual hierarchy in which the appellate court evaluates 
the district court. 
                                                                                                                     
 3 See Drew D. Dropkin, Important Conflict Being Overlooked in Omnicare Case, 
LAW360.COM (Mar. 6, 2014, 1:21 PM), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/ 
library/publication/2014articles/3-6-14_Law360_Dropkin.pdf [http://perma.cc/GB9F-CWSH]. 
 4 Some state courts have similar rules, dictating that a state appellate panel is bound 
by earlier panels in the absence of a ruling from the highest court or an en-banc-like 
determination. When a federal court applies this rule in a diversity case to set aside state 
court precedent, there is a similar tension between loyalty to the Erie principle of 
submitting to state court precedent and the desire to apply the rule accurately (where failure 
to do so would also be in conflict with Erie, since presumably a state court would apply the 
state rule). See, e.g., Griffin v. Reznick, No. 1:08-cv-50, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86974, at 
*17–20 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2008). Existing Supreme Court precedent on how to apply 
lower state court decisions in a diversity case appears to assume that conflict among state 
courts of appeal is permissible. See, e.g., Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 
F.2d 176, 186 (9th Cir. 1989). The extent to which federal courts in diversity cases are 
aware of and apply state-law equivalents of the Rule would be an interesting topic of 
inquiry beyond the scope of this Article. 
 5 This Article takes the reasoning in each opinion at face value. Of course, published 
opinions may not always reflect all the considerations that factored into a decision. 
However, the written analysis in an opinion provides the law and methodology on which 
future litigants and courts will rely. 
 6 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
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II. OBJECTIVE APPROACH 
Some courts appear to take a strictly “objective” approach: examine the 
two decisions and independently determine whether there is a conflict between 
them.7 If the court perceives a conflict, it sets aside the later case and applies 
the earlier one, per the Rule. If the court does not see a conflict, it applies 
whichever precedent it deems more apposite to the case before it.  While it 
may not be possible to be perfectly objective, a court applying this approach is 
making a good faith effort to do so.  
An “objective” court reads the Rule literally, and wants—above all—to 
make the right choice between the two published opinions. Courts applying the 
“objective” approach see no need for a “thumb on the scale” in any direction. 
They make no special effort to reconcile cases that appear to be in tension.8 
They will even reject the Sixth Circuit’s explicit distinction of an earlier 
published decision if they do not find the distinction persuasive.9 Accuracy is 
the goal, and obedience—other than to the Rule itself—does not enter the 
analysis.  
Applying the “objective” approach, a district court declined to apply 
McCullum v. Tepe,10 which held that privately employed doctors working part-
time at a prison do not receive the qualified immunity of prison-employed 
doctors, based on its own determination that McCullum was inconsistent with 
an earlier case granting qualified immunity to a prison-employed doctor.11 In 
doing so, the district court ignored the analysis of McCullum, which clearly 
indicated that the court did not see privately-employed physicians as “legally 
and factually similar” to prison-employed physicians and saw itself as 
addressing a different situation rather than overruling prior case law.12 The 
district court, relying solely on the Rule and its own “objective” analysis of the 
two opinions, concluded there was a conflict, notwithstanding the distinction 
drawn in McCullum.13 
                                                                                                                     
 7 See, e.g., In re Steward, 509 B.R. 123, 125 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2014) (setting 
aside later opinion, as “difficult to square with” an earlier one). 
 8 Id.  
 9 See, e.g., R.L. Polk & Co. v. Infousa, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785-86 ( E.D. 
Mich. 2002) (declining to apply the Sixth Circuit’s published opinion in Therma-Scan as 
inconsistent with its earlier published opinion in Wynn, despite Therma-Scan’s distinction 
of Wynn) (citing Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1988); Therma-Scan, 
Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2002)).  
 10 McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 11 Marcum v. Scioto Cnty., No. 1:10-cv-790-HJW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112100, at 
*66–67 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2014) (citing Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 
2012)). 
 12 See McCullum, 693 F.3d at 700–04 (concluding that “there does not appear to be 
any history of immunity for a private doctor working for the government . . .”). 
 13 See Marcum, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112100 at *67. 
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The Sixth Circuit’s subsequent treatment of McCullum demonstrates that 
relying on a district court case14 whose analysis hinges on application of the 
Rule is risky business. About a month after the district court held in Marcum v. 
Scioto County that McCullum was not good law, the Sixth Circuit relied 
heavily on McCullum in a published opinion in another qualified immunity 
case.15 Given the Sixth Circuit’s embrace of McCullum, relying on Marcum to 
ignore McCullum—and arguing that the panel embracing McCullum also 
violated the Rule—would be an imprudent litigation strategy, notwithstanding 
its theoretical coherence. But when there is no appeal, a decision like Marcum 
may stand—with no warning markers in services like LexisNexis and 
Westlaw—to indicate that it directly diverges from the Sixth Circuit.  
An “objective” district court’s willingness to openly disagree with and set 
aside a Sixth Circuit decision poses a challenge to the judicial hierarchy in 
principle, not just in practice. In practice, district courts almost always have 
the first crack at applying Sixth Circuit precedent, and often that means the 
opportunity to effectively “set aside” a published Sixth Circuit opinion by 
reading it narrowly and thereby declaring it inapposite to the instant case, or 
by reading an intervening Supreme Court case broadly to supersede it. 
However, even a district court thus contriving to avoid a published Sixth 
Circuit opinion is not openly disobeying or categorically ignoring Sixth Circuit 
precedent it acknowledges to be directly applicable. The end result may be the 
same, but the path taken makes a statement about the extent of a district 
court’s duty to defer to the appellate court. 
At the same time, an “objective” court’s devotion to accuracy in applying 
the Rule could be framed as the ultimate in deference to the Sixth Circuit 
itself, because the Sixth Circuit made the Rule. “Objective” courts do not treat 
the Rule as an opportunity to favor a “better” decision over a “worse” one 
according to their own understanding of which is “better” from a policy 
perspective or “better” in the quality of reasoning or depth of analysis. They 
simply determine whether there is a conflict. As a practical matter, the 
“objective” approach likely increases uncertainty for litigants just as much as 
the “substantive” approach discussed below, but theoretically, the “objective” 
district court is doing its best to defer to the Sixth Circuit decision that the 
Sixth Circuit itself declared binding on all future panels.  
III. CONCILIATORY APPROACH 
Other courts believe themselves duty-bound to take a “conciliatory” 
approach: to reconcile the published cases, even when doing so requires some 
contriving and/or not very persuasive distinguishing. “Conciliatory” district 
                                                                                                                     
 14 The same might be said about following a Sixth Circuit decision applying the rule, 
but arguably to a lesser degree.  
 15 See United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 768 F.3d 464, 479–83, 480 n.2 
(6th Cir. 2014). 
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courts believe that “both [published opinions are binding] current law and 
should be distinguished so that they do not conflict.”16  
In some cases, the hard work of reconciling will have been done by the 
later Sixth Circuit panel. Where a later decision “specifically distinguish[es]” 
an earlier one, the later decision will “provide[] guidance in the present case”17 
to a “conciliatory” court.18 The “conciliatory” court will consider itself 
“bound” to apply the later opinion’s distinction, even when it has “no doubt” 
that the later opinion “contradict[s]” the earlier.19   
In cases where the later published opinion does not explicitly distinguish 
the earlier one, “conciliatory” courts effectively turn the Rule into a rule of 
construction, a constraint applied to narrow the universe of acceptable 
interpretations to only those compatible with both cases. As one court 
explained, “to adopt [the defendant’s] interpretation of that statement would 
mean that Freeman abridged Nationwide Property [an earlier Sixth Circuit 
case], which, as a subsequent panel, it cannot do,” and that “the more 
appropriate reading” is a narrower one that reconciles the two cases.20 In 
Richards v. Johnson & Johnson, the court reconciled five Sixth Circuit cases 
by treating “broad language in the later opinions” as dictum and limiting the 
earliest case to its facts, reasoning that “it cannot be assumed that one Sixth 
Circuit panel has overruled, sub silentio, the prior decision of another panel.”21 
Under the “conciliatory” approach, setting aside any published Sixth Circuit 
case is unacceptable, or at least extremely undesirable.  
As evidenced by the above examples, the “conciliatory” approach usually 
achieves its goal of avoiding any direct challenge to the hierarchy (i.e., setting 
aside any Sixth Circuit decision) or to the Rule (i.e., following a later 
published decision over an earlier one) by reading Sixth Circuit precedent 
                                                                                                                     
 16 L & R Farm P’ship v. Cargill Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 798, 806 (W.D. Tenn. 2013). 
 17 See id.; Chinn v. Warden, Mansfield Corr. Inst., No. 3:02-cv-512, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 91248, at *72 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2013) (“[T]he question is not whether the 
distinction is persuasive, but whether it was made by a majority of a Sixth Circuit panel in 
a published decision.”).  
 18 See Chinn, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91248, at *72. 
 19 United States v. Edwards, No. 11-50728, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134714, at *7–8 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2012) (“There is no doubt that Lucido and Carey are likely 
contradictory. As a general proposition, the court would normally be bound to follow 
Carey, the earlier decision. Here, however, the Sixth Circuit in Lucido already determined 
that Carey is not controlling precedent on the jurisdictional issue confronted here. 
Although the Lucido dissent presents a persuasive argument as to why this decision was 
contrary to Sixth Circuit law, this court is nevertheless bound by the majority's holding that 
Carey does not conflict with its ruling.”) (citations omitted). 
 20 Henry v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71046, at *4–6 (N.D. 
Ohio May 20, 2013) (reconciling Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401 
(6th Cir. 2007) with Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 
2008)). 
 21 Richards v. Johnson & Johnson, 688 F. Supp. 2d 754, 778–79 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) 
(reconciling five Sixth Circuit cases, three of which were published), abrogated by 
Engleson v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 611, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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narrowly. In addition to facilitating reconciliation, narrow readings have other 
advantages, such as reinforcing the strictures of Article III22 and encouraging 
litigants to take care in distinguishing between holdings and dicta.  
However, this method of resolving the tension between two published 
decisions can lead a “conciliatory” court to adopt a position that neither Sixth 
Circuit panel would have countenanced, thereby accomplishing neither 
obedience nor accuracy.23 If reconciliation seems too contrived, it can 
undermine respect for the integrity of the judicial process and lead to an 
increasingly tangled web of jurisprudence with no coherent, bigger-picture 
framework.24 Furthermore, the wording of the Rule25 strongly suggests that 
the “first in time” published decision takes firm precedence over any 
subsequent decision, such that its interpretation should not change based on a 
later decision. The conciliatory approach creates the appearance of avoiding all 
conflict, but often fails to do so in reality. 
IV. OBEDIENT APPROACH 
In the “obedient” approach, district courts defer to what they perceive as 
the Sixth Circuit’s current understanding of whether the two decisions conflict. 
Where the later of the two decisions explicitly distinguishes the earlier, and no 
subsequent Sixth Circuit discussion of the issue exists, this approach will reach 
the same outcome as the “conciliatory” approach. However, the difference 
between a “conciliatory” court and an “obedient” one is clear in cases where 
(1) the later of the two published Sixth Circuit opinions does not reconcile the 
two; or (2) additional subsequent Sixth Circuit opinions on the issue exist.  
In these two cases, an “obedient” court will defer to what it perceives to be 
the Sixth Circuit’s current position on the matter, even if that position is stated 
in an unpublished opinion and results in the setting aside of a published 
                                                                                                                     
 22 Narrow readings make it less likely that the Sixth Circuit decisions will be read to 
resolve matters beyond the “case or controversy” directly before them. See U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2. 
 23 Cf. Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1058 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining how 
the Marks rule is not always workable because it is not always possible to find a “common 
denominator” among multiple opinions in a “splintered” Supreme Court decision); Marks 
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 U.S. (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case 
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding 
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24 A helpful analogy is found in mathematics. When trying to detect the pattern that 
generated N data points, it is inadvisable to simply use the N-degree polynomial that will 
perfectly intersect (i.e. “reconcile”) all N points. Instead, it is recommended to use the 
lowest-degree polynomial that will generate a reasonable curve, even if one point (an 
outlier) ends up far off the curve (i.e., a decision ends up being set aside completely). See 
JAAN KIUSALAAS, NUMERICAL METHODS IN ENGINEERING WITH PYTHON 3, at 111 (2013). 
 25 6TH CIR. R. 32.1(b) (“Published panel opinions are binding on later panels. A 
published opinion is overruled only by the court en banc.”). 
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opinion. In the absence of subsequent decisions on the matter, an “obedient” 
court may look for subtler signs “suggest[ing]” the appellate court’s position 
on whether or not a conflict exists, such as “refusal to take up the matter en 
banc.”26   
In particular, when the Sixth Circuit itself applies the Rule to set aside 
published decision B due to its conflict with an earlier published decision A, an 
“obedient” court will follow suit. In McCarty v. Palmer,27 the district court 
declined to follow the published case of Abela v. Martin28 due to its conflict 
with two earlier cases. The court did not independently compare and contrast 
Abela with the earlier cases or defer to Abela’s explicit distinguishing of the 
earlier cases, but simply relied on two unpublished post-Abela Sixth Circuit 
cases declining to follow Abela pursuant to the Rule.29 There was no analysis 
or criticism of the unpublished decisions, no discussion of whether their 
application of the Rule was persuasive. The district court simply accepted that 
the consensus of the Sixth Circuit had moved away from Abela. 
 Similarly, in Moore v. United States, when deciding between the Sixth 
Circuit’s published decisions in United States v. Johnson and United States v.  
Bolka—published four months after Johnson and explicitly distinguishing it—
the magistrate judge did not conduct any independent analysis comparing 
Bolka and Johnson and did not defer to Bolka’s explicit distinguishing of 
Johnson.30 Instead, the magistrate judge catalogued three unpublished post-
Bolka Sixth Circuit decisions: one endorsing Bolka, a later one rejecting Bolka 
under the Rule, and a third one skirting the question.31 The magistrate judge 
adopted the most recent Sixth Circuit decision to discuss Bolka and Johnson 
and concluded that “the current law in this circuit” had rejected Bolka.32 
Under the “obedient” approach, accuracy gives way to obedience 
whenever the two are even slightly at odds. The Rule is turned on its head, 
because published decisions receive less and less deference as they recede in 
memory, while the most recent decisions—even unpublished ones—weigh 
most heavily in the district court’s analysis. However, if practiced by all 
district courts, this approach would likely provide the most certainty for 
                                                                                                                     
 26 See Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 956, 
962 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (“The court's refusal to take up the matter en banc also suggests 
that [the later panel decision contradicting earlier precedent] is now the rule in the Federal 
Circuit.”). 
 27 McCarty v. Palmer, No. 1:07-CV-663, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104075, at *3–4 
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2010), vacated by 461 F. App’x 445, 447 (6th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (unpublished). 
 28 Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 29 McCarty, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104075, at *3–4 (citing Alexander v. Smith, 311 
F. App’x 875, 883 (6th Cir. 2009); Zimmerman v. Cason, 354 F. App’x 228, 234 (6th Cir. 
2009)). 
 30 Moore v. United States, No. 09-CV-10998, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108057, at *22–
25 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2009). 
 31 Id. at *24. 
 32 Id. at *25. 
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litigants on average. And, a district court may believe that deferring to the 
Sixth Circuit’s application of the Rule—created by the appellate court—leads 
to higher accuracy than district courts applying the Rule on their own. 
Although decisions taking the “objective” approach or the “substantive” 
approach, are probably more likely to wind up at odds with the Sixth Circuit, 
even a district court applying the “obedient” approach—doing its best to apply 
the Rule the way the Sixth Circuit would—can also find itself ultimately “out 
in the cold.”33 In general, any reliance on the Rule ought to be viewed as a flag 
for en banc potential: if a district court perceives two decisions to be 
incompatible, then there is likely a viable argument that “en banc 
consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s 
decisions.”34  
V. SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH 
Finally, in a “substantive” approach, some district courts openly 
incorporate their view of the merits or quality of the two decisions into their 
analysis under the Rule. For example, in In re Jones, the bankruptcy court 
chose to set aside a Sixth Circuit published opinion “[f]irst,” because it found 
the earlier opinion to be “more respectful of state sovereignty . . . and . . . more 
consistent with the tenor of the Constitution,” and only “[s]econd,” due to the 
Rule.35 In Kepley v. Lanz,36 the court cited the Rule to follow an earlier Sixth 
Circuit opinion because it “conducted a thorough analysis of the rationale 
underlying” the applicable state law, unlike the later opinion, which simply 
relied on a First Circuit case.37 And a district court applied the Rule to set 
aside the Sixth Circuit case of Clark v. Chrysler, in part because it was 
“contrary to several Supreme Court opinions,” even though the panel had 
considered and distinguished both of those Supreme Court opinions,38 and, in 
                                                                                                                     
 33 See, e.g., McCarty, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104075, at *3–4. In McCarty, the 
district court relied on two unpublished Sixth Circuit decisions flatly setting aside a 
published Sixth Circuit decision pursuant to the Rule. Id. Several months later the Sixth 
Circuit en banc reconciled the published decision with the unpublished decisions, which 
led to a reversal of McCarty. McCarty, 461 F. App’x at 447 (citing Guilmette v. Howes, 
624 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 
 34 FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1); see also 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 35(a) (“A petition for rehearing 
en banc is an extraordinary procedure intended to bring to the attention of the entire 
court . . . an opinion that directly conflicts with . . . Sixth Circuit precedent.”). 
 35 In re Jones, 428 B.R. 720, 727 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010), rev’d sub nom. In re 
Schafer, 455 B.R. 590 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011), rev’d 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 36 Kepley v. Lanz, 992 F. Supp. 2d 781, 786–87 & n.1 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
 37 The district court had failed to notice that the earlier Sixth Circuit case was 
unpublished, and therefore non-binding. On motion for reconsideration, the court 
acknowledged that it was bound to follow the later, published opinion and reversed itself. 
Kepley, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 787–88 n.1. 
 38 In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No.1:03-CV-17000, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 146067, at *343–44 (N.D. Ohio June 4, 2010) (citing the Rule to set aside Clark v. 
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any case, there was room to distinguish Clark from the earlier Sixth Circuit 
cases.39 Courts taking a “substantive” approach apply the Rule to advance 
what they see as the more correct decision. 
Although one might expect the Sixth Circuit to take offense to district 
courts injecting their view of the merits into applications of the Rule, its 
reviews of such decisions appear to focus on the merits of the question with no 
rebuke for overreaching. In one case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s applying the Rule to set aside a published Sixth Circuit opinion in 
favor of an earlier Federal Circuit opinion because the Federal Circuit had 
“correctly applied Sixth Circuit precedent, and thus, although the citation was 
in error, the substance of the district court’s analysis was accurate.”40 
Although it reversed in Jones, the Sixth Circuit stuck to the merits in its 
analysis and did not rebuke the bankruptcy court for choosing among Sixth 
Circuit precedents based on its own view of the “tenor of the Constitution.”41  
At first glance, the “substantive” approach appears to serve neither 
accuracy (in applying the Rule) nor obedience to the appellate court, and could 
even be viewed as “judicial activism” on the part of the district court. On the 
other hand, a “substantive” district court’s tendency to examine circuit 
precedent critically and independently evaluate it—on the merits and as to 
whether a conflict exists—arguably adds value by drawing the Sixth Circuit’s 
attention to a potential conflict and flagging flaws in one or both of the 
decisions. Those who believe that substantive considerations factor into every 
purportedly procedural decision might see the “substantive” approach as more 
transparent than the others, because it identifies the precise substantive issues 
that influenced the court’s opinion.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The above framework comes primarily from a non-exhaustive survey of 
approximately five years of district court precedent in the Sixth Circuit, and 
raises a number of interesting questions that would require a more extensive 
                                                                                                                     
Chrysler Corp., 436 F.3d 594, 604 (6th Cir. 2006)). Normally, a district court must defer to 
the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, so the district court’s 
opinion of whether Clark correctly analyzed Supreme Court precedent would not—without 
the Rule—permit it to ignore Clark. See In re Stasson, 472 B.R. 748, 753 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2012); Holtgreive v. Curtis, 174 F. Supp. 2d 572, 580 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 39 See In re Heparin Prods. Liab. Litig., 273 F.R.D. 399, 408 (N.D. Ohio 2011) 
(reading Clark more narrowly and distinguishing it). 
 40 Whitesell Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 496 F. App’x 551, 557 n.2 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(unpublished). The district court had mistakenly cited the Federal Circuit opinion as being 
a Sixth Circuit opinion, so this was not a typical “substantive” approach case where the 
district court allows its opinion of the issue’s merits to play a role in its application of the 
Rule.  
 41 In re Schafer, 689 F.3d at 606 (“Unlike the bankruptcy court, we do not read 
Rhodes to conflict with Hood, which had nothing to do with the issue of exemptions and, 
therefore, did not discuss Rhodes.”). 
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empirical review of the much larger data set provided by the vast majority of 
circuits which have followed the Rule for decades. Among other things, it 
would be interesting to explore in a longer piece the relative prevalence of 
these approaches, relative rates of affirmance and reversal, to see when—if 
ever—reliance on the Rule elicits rebuke (not merely reversal on the merits, 
but criticism of the court’s methodology) from an appellate court, and how 
often some of the potential problems discussed above (like a “conciliatory” 
court creating distinctions clearly not anticipated by either of the decisions it is 
attempting to reconcile) actually arise. 
